Philosophy Papers

The Liar Reveals The Truth
I use the liar paradox (“This sentence is false,” which if true must be false, and if false must be true) as a platform from which to argue that there are two distinct (though closely related) notions of truth, and once understood many paradoxes dissolve.  The unfortunate consequence is that classical logic is shewn to be insufficient, but I suggest that a more robust formal system based entirely on functions might be able to account for the extreme cases.
[Publication details: This is a work in progress -- please do not cite without express permission]

Physicalism and the Ineffability of Experience (shorter version: here)
I argue that a posteriori physicalism can survive the most famous and persistent arguments against it, once we stop thinking of the “physical” as merely that which is plottable in space-time, but rather as the plottable along with that which necessarily supervenes upon it.
[Publication details: MA thesis at the University of California, 2008]

Putnam’s Vat
For the sake of argument I grant semantic externalism, and attempt to argue that we cannot conclude from that that we are not brains in vats.  Semantic externalism merely transforms skepticism about the external world into skepticism about our ability to know what our words mean.
[Publication details: UCSC undergraduate journal of philosophy, 2006]